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Abstract. Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers 
responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of 
at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transact­
ing partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a 
transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to 
cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and 
tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered. JEL 
Classification: H26 
L'evasion fiscale collective. Dans !cs analyses de !'evasion fiscale, on suppose habituelle­
ment que le payeur de taxe fait face a un ensemble donne de politiques auxquelles ii reagit. 
Pourtant, dans le cas des transactions marchandes, !'evasion fiscale n'est possible que si 
plusieurs agents cooperent ensemble. La probabilite que !'evasion soit detectee depend alors 
des efforts que chacun fait pour la cacher. Dans un tel contexte, de plus lourdes sanctions 
accroissent le coiit espere des transactions illegales, mais peuvent aussi, indirectement, accroitre 
l'incitation pour Jes partenaires a cooperer pour cacher leur activite illegale. II en resulte que 
le coiit total des transactions illegales peut diminuer et !'evasion fiscale augmenter. Nous 
etudions Jes implications de ce phenomene. 
1. Introduction
Most of the literature on tax evasion is presented in a principal/agent framework, 
with the government (principal) trying to provide the right incentives to each tax-
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 payer (agent).' This type of analysis might be suitable for income taxes because the
 main strategic interaction is between the taxpayer and the government. However,
 there are many types of tax evasion that involve the participation of more than one
 taxpayer. Taxes on transactions, such as sales taxes, excise taxes on tobacco or
 alcohol, and taxes on trade are examples of taxes for which evasion often involves
 the collaboration of at least two taxpayers - a buyer and a seller. In fact, even
 income tax evasion might require at least the complicity of second parties, as when
 labour services are supplied in the untaxed sector. Our purpose in this paper is to
 investigate the determinants of tax evasion in settings where both agents to a trans-
 action must collaborate to determine whether to undertake it in the illegal sector.
 Although our analysis involves tax evasion, it applies more generally to any form of
 criminal behaviour in which two agents collaborate in a criminal activity, including
 prostitution, the exchange of illegal goods (e.g., drugs), or a bank robbery per-
 formed by more that one agent. When two agents agree to evade taxes, they face the
 possibility of being detected and sanctioned. We suppose that the probability of this
 depends upon effort devoted to avoiding detection by the two transacting partners.2
 An increase in the sanction for tax evasion leads to a direct increase in the expected
 cost of a transaction in the illegal sector. However, a higher sanction may also
 facilitate cooperation between criminals by reducing the incentive to cheat. It may
 then be the case that a small increase in the sanction reduces the total cost of a
 transaction in the illegal sector and therefore increases tax evasion.
 We construct a model in which a continuum of infinitely lived agents, differing
 only in their aversion to dishonesty, decide whether to undertake their transactions
 in the legal or the illegal sector. All agents undertake a large number of transactions
 each period - for simplicity, one with every other agent in the economy. This ensures
 that pairs of agents form lasting repeated relationships and that relationships span
 all combinations of honesty-types. For each transaction in each period, the pair of
 agents involved can choose which sector to use. We assume that no agent can force
 another one to transact in the illegal sector. Those who choose the legal sector in a
 given period obtain a sure benefit from the transaction, but have to pay a tax. Those
 I The classic analysis is by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For general reviews of the traditional
 literature, see Cowell (1990) and Myles (1995). Tax evasion has been incorporated into an optimal
 non-linear income tax setting by Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Marhuenda and Ortufno-Ortin
 (1997), and Chandar and Wilde (1998). Some recent analysis has departed from the principal-
 agent setting by allowing taxpayers and tax collectors to collude. See, for example, Flatters and
 MacLeod (1995) and Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999). In this literature, there is no coopera-
 tion among taxpayers, which is the focus of our analysis.
 2 When transacting in the illegal sector, individuals can cheat in several ways. One possibility is for
 an individual to provide less care than was agreed on in avoiding detection by the authority. This
 is the kind of cheating we are focusing on in this analysis. Of course, such cheating increases the
 probability of detection for all individuals involved in the transaction. Examples of such cheating
 are that an individual may publicly (rather than privately) consume a good, or that he may openly
 discuss the 'low' price he paid for the good. Another example is that individuals who have trans-
 acted in the illegal sector should also provide care so as to avoid being caught for other crimes,
 because observing one crime may reveal that other crimes have been committed.
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 who choose the illegal sector avoid paying taxes, but may be caught and sanctioned.
 They receive an uncertain benefit that depends on their aversion to dishonesty and
 on the level of crime enforcement undertaken by the government. The chances of
 getting caught engaging in an illegal transaction depend partly on the amount of
 costly avoidance effort that is provided jointly by the two parties to the transactions.
 In our base case, the payoffs to participating in an illegal activity take the form
 of a prisoner's dilemma, and the two agents transacting in the illegal sector can
 potentially increase their payoff by simultaneously providing a high, or cooperative,
 level of avoidance effort. However, they will then expose themselves to potential
 deviation by their partner. Because contracts in the illegal sector are not enforce-
 able, reputations and punishments must be relied on as mechanisms to enforce
 higher levels of effort. The possibility of cooperation enhances the payoffs from
 illegal activity. To enforce cooperation, agents will punish each other. Depending
 on the agents involved, the punishment may occur in either the legal or the illegal
 sector with low (non-cooperative) avoidance effort levels. For some agents - those
 with a higher aversion to dishonesty - the non-cooperative equilibrium in the illegal
 sector yields a lower expected payoff than that of the legal sector. Consequently, if
 one of them prefers the legal sector, they will transact in the legal sector for the
 duration of the punishment phase. On the other hand, if both prefer the illegal
 sector, they will keep on evading taxes with non-cooperative levels of avoidance for
 the duration of the punishment phase.
 Under the assumptions we make, the resulting equilibrium takes the following
 form. Agents with high aversion to dishonesty pay taxes on all their transactions.
 Agents with low or medium aversion avoid taxes by transacting in the illegal sector
 with all agents willing to do so. Agents in the illegal sector cooperate with other
 agents in the illegal sector until one of them deviates. When one partner deviates,
 they enter the punishment phase of the strategy. Pairs of agents with low aversion to
 dishonesty remain in the illegal sector for the punishment phase, while those in
 which at least one of the two agents has a medium aversion to dishonesty go back to
 the legal sector. Because an agent's aversion to dishonesty is observable to other
 agents, and because agents are not willing to make a transaction in the illegal sector
 if they know that their partner will cheat, some agents who would prefer to trade in
 the illegal sector simply cannot do so. Indeed, some agents are unable to commit to
 behaving cooperatively in the illegal sector and, consequently, have to undertake all
 their transactions in the legal sector. This implies that in equilibrium, there is no
 deviation from cooperative behaviour in the illegal sector. In contrast to the stan-
 dard literature, we find that it is not solely the willingness to participate in the
 illegal sector that determines which agents evade taxes, but also their ability to
 commit not to cheat. Some agents are left out of the illegal sector, despite their
 desire to transact in it, simply because they cannot commit to providing the coop-
 erative level of avoidance effort.
 When the government changes the level of the sanction, all payoffs in the illegal
 sector decrease, but in different proportions for different types of participant. An
increase in the sanction can lead to a larger reduction in the deviation payoff than in 
the cooperation payoff. This can increase cooperation, thereby increasing tax eva­
sion. Despite the direct impact of an increase in the sanction on the expected payoff 
of transacting in the illegal sector, tax evasion can increase with an increase in 
sanction because it is the ability to commit not to cheat that determines which 
agents evade taxes. By the same token, an increase in the tax rate can lead to an 
increase in tax evasion. 
In the following section, we formulate the model and our assumptions, and set 
out the types of equilibria in avoidance effort and their results for the case where 
sanctions are such that payoffs in the illegal sector take the form of a prisoner's 
dilemma. In section 3, we analyse which levels of dishonesty will be sufficient to 
enable agents to commit to cooperative transactions in the illegal sector repeatedly. 
We establish precisely how transactions divide themselves between the legal and 
illegal sectors according to the aversion to dishonesty of the partners. We show that 
all transactions in the illegal sector will be accompanied by cooperative avoidance 
effort levels - no one will deviate in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the 
number of transactions carried out illegally will increase in the sanction as well as 
in the tax rate provided the discount rate is high enough. In section 4, we extend our 
analysis to the case where sanctions are such that the payoffs to participating in an 
illegal activity no longer take the form of a prisoner's dilemma. This suggests some 
policy implications for the optimal level of sanctions. We conclude in section 5. 
2. The model
We are interested in any economic activity involving two partners that can be under­
taken either legally or illegally. We call the activity a transaction and, for simplicity, 
we call the partners the buyer and the seller. Naturally, since all transactions involve 
a buyer and a seller, there are equal numbers of buyers and sellers in this economy. 
We assume, for simplicity, that there is a continuum of sellers Sand buyers B, and 
that their populations are normalized to unity. Within each group, agents differ only 
in their tolerance for engaging in illegal transactions - those that involve evading 
taxes. Denote this tolerance for dishonesty by 0, with (J E [O, 1]. The distribution of 
0 for each group k = S,B is given by the distribution function F k (O), where 
pk ' (O) > 0 for all (J E [O, 1]. Agents in each population engage in many bilateral 
transactions with those in the other, and these may be in the underground (illegal) 
sector u or the legal one l. Our analysis focuses on representative types of transac­
tions that can occur in each sector. 
To facilitate the analysis, we make the extreme assumption that each seller from 
population S engages in a large number of transactions per period , one with every 
buyer in population B, and that both types of agents are infinitely lived. We can then 
treat each sequence of transactions between a given pair of agents as an infinitely 
repeated game in which lasting relationships between sellers and buyers determine 
the nature of the transactions. In particular, since the payoffs from transactions 
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 depend upon whether agents behave cooperatively or not, repeated relationships
 can give rise to cooperative behaviour's being sustained in equilibrium.3
 All agents are risk neutral. They can undertake any given transaction in the legal
 or the illegal sector, provided the agent with whom they are transacting agrees.
 There will be some agents who conduct a portion of their transactions in sector I
 and the rest in sector u. We abstract from production and simply suppose that, for
 legal transactions, each seller and buyer receives a before-tax benefit per period of
 VS and VB, respectively. Those of type 0 who transact in the illegal sector only get
 benefits of Ovs or OVB, as well as incurring the chance of being caught. For trans-
 actions in sector 1, a tax tk per transaction is levied on each agents of type k = S, B.
 The net benefit an agent in population k obtains per transaction in sector 1, denoted
 1TI, is therefore 1T = Vk - tk-
 Agents transacting in sector u pay no tax. Those who are detected evading the tax
 have sanctions ss or SB imposed on them. Although sanctions can vary for buyers
 and sellers, illegal transactions are detected on the spot. Thus, both agents are detected
 at the same time, so they share the same probability of detection. In fact, for the first
 part of our analysis, we shall assume, for simplicity, that sanctions are also the same
 for both types of agents (SS = SB). Later, we take up the case where sanctions can be
 asymmetric. Qualitatively similar results will occur if probabilities of sanctions are
 asymmetric, but the analysis is more complicated. Agents can reduce the likelihood
 of detection by providing some costly avoidance effort. For simplicity, we assume
 that effort can take only two values, high (H) or low (L), and that the cost associ-
 ated with each of these choices is c and zero, respectively, the same for both pop-
 ulations. We assume that c < tk; otherwise, legal transaction will always dominate
 illegal ones accompanied by high level of effort. The avoidance effort levels of the
 two individuals engaged in an illegal transaction combine to yield a probability that
 their transaction will be detected. If both choose effort H, then the probability isp2;
 if both choose effort L, the probability is po; and if only one chooses effort H, the
 probability is pl. It is natural to assume that as total avoidance effort increases, the
 probability that an illegal transaction will be detected decreases, so pO > Pi > P2 .4
 Note the important point that the probability of detection depends only on current
 3 An alternative, more complex model would assume that transactions occur randomly between
 agents in S and B. Kandori (1 992a,b) has shown that the Folk Theorem for repeated games can be
 generalized to the case of a large community of individuals who are matched randomly in pairs
 each period. Even if two individuals are matched only once, cooperation can be enforced if their
 behaviour in previous matches is observable. In that case, an individual may want to cooperate
 because cheating now will trigger retaliation by future partners, whoever they may be. But obvi-
 ously, for this to be implementable each tax evader's history needs to be observable by all agents.
 In this case, transgressions could be punished not only by one agent but by the entire market,
 making cooperation even easier to sustain. At the same time, one can argue that the government
 might also be able to observe the history of behaviour and enhance its enforcement accordingly.
 To rule out in the simplest way the possibility of illegal behaviour's being publicly observable, we
 adopt the environment described.
 4 The impact of both agents' effort is assumed to be symmetric. Results similar to those derived
 below could be obtained in a generalized version of the current model, in which effort from each
 type has it own impact on the probability of detection.
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 avoidance effort. It does not depend either on past avoidance effort or on whether
 illegal behaviour has been detected in the past. This is obviously a strong assump-
 tion: it is conceivable that enforcement agencies monitor past criminals more inten-
 sively than they monitor those who have never been convicted. Nonetheless, the
 assumption is not uncommon in the literature and we adopt it for simplicity. By the
 same token, we assume that the sanctions s and SB are independent of past
 convictions.
 We assume that agents undertaking an illegal transaction choose their avoidance
 effort levels simultaneously. Two individuals providing maximal avoidance effort H
 are said to cooperate. Under cooperation, agent i in population k obtains a payoff
 i,k} = kO Vk - P2 Sk - c. Alternatively, the two individuals may not cooperate and
 provide minimal avoidance effort L. Under no cooperation, the payoff of agent i in
 population k is 7r'i k} =ik - Po Sk. Because effort is chosen simultaneously, an
 individual may fool his cooperating partner and deviate from maximal to minimal
 avoidance effort. Because the fooled partner provides low effort, the payoff of agent
 i in population k who deviates is 1Wdk*j = OiVk - PI Sk. That of the fooled partner, say
 j, iS fT{j k} Oj V P pSk - C.
 As mentioned, in each period all sellers of group S make one transaction with
 every buyer of group B. It is worth describing precisely the sequence of events and
 the information assumptions applying in each period. At the beginning of every
 period, each agent observes for every other agent with whom they transact: (i) their
 tolerance to dishonesty 0, and (ii) the level of avoidance effort exerted in all previ-
 ous illegal transactions in which the two engaged. Given that information, agents
 from each group choose which of their transactions with the other group to under-
 take in the legal or illegal sectors. Since no agent can force another agent to engage
 in an illegal transaction, a transaction will be undertaken in sector u only if both
 agents prefer to do so. If one or both agents choose a legal transaction, each agent
 gets a payoff vk - tk and the game moves to the next period. If both agents choose
 the illegal sector, the game moves to the next stage where avoidance effort levels are
 chosen. Both agents choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively their levels of
 effort (which can differ from that in previous periods and in other transactions in
 the same period), and probabilities of detection are determined. Next, the illegal
 transactions occur. Some of them are detected, sanctions are imposed, and agents'
 payoffs are determined. Since the probability of detection depends only on current-
 period avoidance effort, the sequence of transactions constitute a repeated game in
 which the only link between periods is the ability of agents to observe the past
 behaviour of their partners. This sequence of events is summarized in the game tree
 of figure 1.
 As figure 1 indicates, the stage game of the repeated game involving a pair of agents
 includes, first, the choice of sector in which to transact and, second, if the transaction
 is in the illegal sector, the amount of avoidance effort exerted by each agent. The lat-
 ter two-player subgame is referred to in what follows as the effort subgame of the stage
 game. The possible payoffs of this effort subgame in which each player chooses be-
 tween cooperating and not cooperating are fi k , Z= c, n, d,f. In figure 2, we present
(Payoff of B;, Payoff of Sj ) 
FIGURE I The stage game 
the effort subgame payoffs for a player i from population Sand player j from popu­
Iation B. 5 
For each transaction in every period, agents must decide whether to transact in 
the illegal sector and, if so, how much effort to provide. The various parameter 
values and the size of the sanctions determine how transactions are divided between 
the legal and illegal sectors, and the nature of the equilibrium in the latter. In order 
to ensure that there is an interior solution with transactions divided between the 
legal and illegal sectors, we make the following assumption: 
ASSUMPTION 1. Interior solution: 
(a) tk > Posk > P2Sk + c 
(b) P 1 sk + c > tk 
(c) Uk - tk > 0
fork= S,B 
fork= S,B 
fork= S,B. 
Part (a) implies that for Ok = I, 7T(i.k} > 1rD.k}, which says that for some agents -
those with high enough values of O - it is better to evade taxes if they can cooperate
than to transact in the legal sector. This ensures that there will be some tax evasion 
in equilibrium. Part (a) also implies that for Ok= I, 1rt,kl > 1r{i,k}, meaning that for
agents with sufficiently high values of 0, evading taxes under no cooperation <lorn-
5 It is easy to generalize this model to all crimes where two or more criminals need to interact (such 
as illegal drugs trafficking or prostitution), by setting tax to zero and benefit of transacting in the 
legal sector also to zero. Figure 2 will take the same form, and all results will apply. 
Player j 
H 
H 
"\°;,,,} = B;vs - pzss - r 
"{j,R} = B;VR - pzSR - C 
"j;,s) = B;vs - P18s - r 
r.t.B) = BfVB - P1SB 
Player i >-- --- - ----------1-----·--·--- -------i 
L 
r.z,.s) = B;vs - JJ1Ss 
r.{j,B) = fJjVR - P1SR - C 
FIGURE 2 The effort subgame payoffs 
7T{i,S} = B,vs - poss 
"{i,B) = BjvH - Posa 
inates a transaction in the legal sector. The implication of part (a) is that both 
cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes in the illegal sector are possible. Part (b) 
states that all individuals prefer to transact in the legal sector than to be fooled. Part 
( c) ensures that all individuals prefer to transact legally rather than not transacting
at all, and, in addition, for 8k = 0, 1r{;, k} > 1rfr kl· This ensures that some persons will
transact in the legal sector. In what follows, assumption 1 is invoked as required to
ensure an interior solution.
Next, it is useful to identify the circumstances in which the payoffs in the illegal 
sector constitute a prisoner's dilemma. The following assumption provides the 
characterization: 6 
ASSUMPTION 2. Prisoner's dilemma: 
(a) P2Sk + c < PoSk
(b) P1Sk + c > Posk
(c) P2Sk + c > P1Sk
fork= S,B 
fork= S,B 
fork= S,B 
Part (a) says that the payoff under cooperation is larger than that under no cooper­
ation. Part (b) implies that the best response to non-cooperation is to not cooperate. 
Part (c) ensures that there is an incentive to fool one's cooperating partner and 
deviate. If assumption 2 applies for both agents, the effort subgame constitutes a 
prisoner's dilemma. 
We shall consider both the case where assumption 2 is satisfied and that where it 
is not. To start, we focus on the symmetric case where sanctions are the same for 
both sellers and buyers ( s s = s B = s). Symmetric sanctions ensure that both types of 
agent either satisfy each of the parts of assumption 2 or do not. The analysis is more 
complicated if sanctions are asymmetric, and we return to this case in section 5. 
Under symmetric sanctions, we can identify three ranges of values of s over which 
the prisoner's dilemma does and does not apply. Whens = 0, part (a) is not satisfied. 
6 Mongrain (2001) shows 1 1 ,,11 the same prisoner's dilemma structure for the payoffs can be obtained 
in a continuous effort model. 
Prisoner's 
L dilemma _____......._.. H 
FIGURE 3 Choices in the effort subgame as a function of s
s 
Both agents choose a low level of effort (which is also Pareto optimal), and the 
subgame does not exhibit the features of a prisoner's dilemma.7 As s increases, this 
continues to apply until s reaches the point where (a) is just satisfied, say,§. At this 
point, the prisoner's dilemma game becomes the relevant one. This continues to be 
the case until s becomes large enough that part (b) and/or (c) are not satisfied, say, 
s. For all values of s > s, the Nash equilibrium of the effort subgame is to cooperate
( which is also Pareto optimal), so again the subgame is no longer a prisoner's dilemma.
This is summarized in figure 3, which depicts the choices made by the players in the
effort subgame for the various ranges of s.
Below, our basic analysis will be for the middle range§ :5 s :5 s in which assump­
tion 2 is satisfied. The extension to the cases where it is violated on either side turns 
out to be straightforward and to yield standard results, as will be seen in section 4. 
In the following two sections, we study the equilibrium of this repeated game for 
different types of agent and the level of illegal transactions this entails. For com­
parison purposes it is useful to summarize the results that would be obtained if the 
game described above were one-shot rather than repeated (e.g., if previous behav­
iour were not observable). In all cases, the one-shot game leads to equilibria that 
yield the same results as in the traditional tax evasion literature. Ifs :5 s, so that the 
Nash equilibrium for illegal transactions involves low levels of effort, then only 
pairs of agents for which the benefit to each of transacting in the illegal sector with 
low effort exceeds the benefit of transacting legally ( 1r n > 1r 1 ) will evade taxes. All 
other pairs will transact legally. Since willingness to evade taxes determine the level 
of tax evasion, an increase in the sanction s will always reduce the size of the 
underground economy. Similarly, for the case where the Nash equilibrium is to 
provide a high level of effort (s > s), the same intuition applies, except that high 
effort is provided. Consequently, in a one-shot game, if sanctioning is costless it is 
always marginally crime reducing to increase sanctions. The authorities will always 
prefer to set s to its maximum possible value. 
3. The repeated prisoner's dilemma game
We now turn to the determination of which pairs of agents transact in the illegal 
sector and which pairs transact in the legal sector for the case where assumption 2 
is satisfied. This involves specifying the circumstances that must apply for (repeat-
7 Note also that part (a) of assumption I is not satisfied, but this is inconsequential, since a high 
level of effort will never be exerted. 
ed) equilibrium transactions in the illegal sector to entail cooperative behaviour. To 
anticipate our results, we shall show that only two sorts of transaction will occur in 
equilibrium - those in the legal sector and cooperative outcomes in the illegal sec­
tor. Thus, there will be no deviations from cooperative behaviour in equilibrium. 
There will be a marginal agent with Ok = Ok in each population k = S, B such that 
transactions will be in the illegal sector only if both agents have Ok 2:: Ok. If at least 
one agent has Ok < Ok, the transaction will be a legal one. Having characterized Ok, 
we can then show how government policies affect the volume of illegal transac­
tions. Paradoxically, increasing the sanction level sk on either group can actually 
increase the number of illegal transactions. At the same time, increases in the tax 
rate tk will increase the size of the illegal sector. 
We begin by considering how certain pairs of agents can sustain a high level of 
effort, given that both choose to undertake the transaction in the illegal sector. The 
strategies for each agent and for each transaction in the illegal sector are assumed to 
be the following. All agents use the same trigger strategy with infinitely lasting 
punishment, where the form of punishment is discussed below. In any time period, 
for each transaction in the illegal sector, seller i in population S chooses a high 
effort level with every buyer j in population B who never deviated in any transaction 
with him in the past. At the same time, seller i in population S punishes every buyer 
j in population B who deviated in any illegal transaction with him in the past. 
Equivalently, for any transaction between agents i and) in the illegal sector, if buyer 
j in population B deviates in any time period, seller i in population Swill punish 
him in all subsequent periods. This is one of an indefinite number of strategies that 
would lead to similar results. We choose to concentrate on this particular strategy 
because it is simple and standard in the literature on repeated games. 
Punishments might take one of two forms. After agent j deviates, i might punish 
j by exerting low effort in all subsequent illegal transactions. As a result, all future 
illegal transactions between the pair would be non-cooperative equilibria. Alterna­
tively, i might simply refuse to transact illegally, in which case all future transac­
tions are in the legal sector. To choose between these two possible punishments, we 
follow Abreu (1988) and assume that agent i selects the punishment that imposes 
the worst payoff on the non-cooperating agent). This necessarily involves punish­
ment in the legal sector: if the non-cooperating agent is worse off in the illegal 
sector, then he can refuse to transact illegally.8 In fact, allowing for the possibility 
that punishing agents agree to punish (non-cooperatively) in the illegal sector if 
they are better off in the non-cooperative equilibrium than in the legal sector does 
not affect our main results. In particular, as we show below, it does not affect the 
total number of illegal transactions, nor does it affect how that number varies with 
the severity of sanctions or the tax rate. 
The decision to transact in the legal or the illegal sector is simple. If the two 
agents are in a punishment phase, the transaction is legal. If they are not in a 
8 Abreu (1988) makes the case for the use of a Nash equilibrium, which inflicts the worse possible 
punishment on deviators. For a textbook discussion on punishments in infinitely repeated games, 
see Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, chap 5). 
punishment phase, for each pair, a buyer (or seller) will choose the legal sector if 
the expected payoff is larger than that in the illegal sector. It is important to note 
that since the equilibrium payoffs in the effort subgame depend on 8, the choice of 
legal versus illegal sector will also depend on this observable variable. We begin by 
characterizing various ranges of values of 8 that will allow us to determine which 
pairs of agents are able to cooperate in equilibrium in the illegal sector, which are 
unable to cooperate but would still prefer to transact noncooperatively in the illegal 
sector, and which would prefer transacting in the legal sector. 
First, we establish the conditions under which agents i in population S andj in 
population B can commit in an infinitely repeated series of transaction to exerting 
the cooperative level of effort. An agent who can commit to cooperation is one who 
is better off being in a cooperative equilibrium indefinitely rather than deviating 
now and subsequently being punished forever, where the punishment is in the legal 
sector. Let 8k be the discount factor for all agents of type k = S,B. Lemma 1 
indicates which individuals in the two groups have the incentive to cooperate in 
equilibrium. The proofs of this and other propositions are given in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 1. An agent drawn from population k (k = S,B) can commit to cooperating
forever if and only if8 2: 8k, where 
_ 8k(vk - tk) + (p2sk + c) - (1- 8k)p,sk 
Ok = � UkVk (2) 
The marginal agents in population S with 85 and in population B with 88 are the 
ones who can just commit to cooperating forever if transacting in the illegal sector. 
Therefore, cooperation in the illegal sector will occur for transactions between all 
pairs of agents i andj such that 8 2: 85 for agent i in population Sand 8 2: 88 for 
agentj in population B. Conversely, if at least one agent to a transaction has 8 < 8k 
fork= S,B, then the transaction will take place in the legal sector.9 
Having established which agents can commit themselves to cooperating if they 
choose the illegal sector, we now examine which agents will in fact prefer to make 
their transactions in the illegal sector. 
LEMMA 2. An agent i in population k (k = S,B) would prefer to cooperate in the
illegal sector rather than transacting in the legal sector if 8 2: 8k, where 8k is 
given by 
(3) 
9 It should be noted that even if the sanction is zero for one of the two types of agents, those agents 
will still have an incentive to provide effort in hiding the crime, provided tk > c. The reason is 
that, even if those agents cannot be sanctioned, they still want to provide the effort to keep the 
relationship in a cooperation state, since they share in the benefits of avoiding the tax. Our main 
results turn out to apply in this case. 
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 It can be seen that 6k is decreasing in tk and increasing is Sk.
 Finally, it is useful to identify those in the population who would rather transact
 in the legal sector than in the illegal sector when there is no cooperation.
 LEMMA 3. An agent i in population k (k = S, B) prefers transacting illegally without
 cooperation to transacting legally if 0 ? 6k, where 6k is given by
 Vk - tk + POSk
 Ok -=<1.
 Vk
 The following relationship applies among the three marginal agents of lemmas
 1-3:
 LEMMA 4. 0 < k < <k < 1.
 The two middle inequalities in lemma 4 are important. The first implies that the
 number of agents in each population who would like to transact in the illegal sector
 if they could cooperate (those with 6 ' Sk) is larger than the number of agents who
 can commit to cooperating in the illegal sector (those with 0 ' Sk). This leaves us
 with some agents who would be better off in the illegal sector in a cooperative
 equilibrium, but cannot commit themselves to cooperating. Since, by the second
 inequality, those individuals also prefer the legal sector to the illegal sector without
 cooperation, they necessarily end up in the legal sector. The capacity to commit to
 cooperating is therefore a key factor. It is this capacity that ultimately determines
 who transacts in the legal or the illegal sector.
 The second inequality is relevant for another reason. Those with ok < 0A < Ok
 prefer the legal sector to the illegal sector without cooperation. Therefore, all those
 who cannot commit prefer to take their punishment in the legal sector. In proving
 lemma 1, we assumed that punishment would be in the legal sector. If punishment
 in the illegal sector had been allowed, these agents would still be punished in the
 legal sector, since they would refuse to transact non-cooperatively in the illegal
 sector. Therefore, lemma 1 would not be affected if punishment in the illegal sector
 were allowed. However, those with 6k < k < 6k prefer the illegal sector without
 cooperation to the legal sector. It is then possible that for 0k high enough, agents
 would choose not to cooperate if the strategy profile entailed punishment in the
 illegal sector. In this case, the possibility of punishment in the illegal sector might
 result in a group of agents with the highest values of 0 transacting non-cooperatively
 in the illegal sector. This possibility does not affect our results, since these persons
 will always be infra-marginal in the illegal sector. From now on, we assume, fol-
 lowing Abreu (1988) and as discussed above, that maximal punishment is imposed,
 implying that it takes place in the legal sector.
 We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium when assumption 2 (pris-
 oner's dilemma in the effort subgame) is satisfied. All agents in each population
 with 6 < Sk prefer to trade in the legal sector, so they will make all their transactions
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 Transact in legal sector Iransact in illegal sector
 0 ok ok 1
 Prefer legal Prefer
 sector to cooperation
 cooperation to legal sector
 Cannot commit to cooperate Can commit to cooperate
 FIGURE 4 Equilibrium transactions
 there. (Recall that they cannot be forced to trade in the illegal sector.) All agents in
 each population with Ok C 0 Ck would prefer to cooperate in the illegal sector
 rather than trade in the legal sector. They are not able to commit to cooperating in
 equilibrium, however, so any illegal trades must involve a non-cooperative (low
 avoidance effort) equilibrium. In these circumstances, they prefer the legal sector
 over the non-cooperative equilibrium in the illegal sector, so they all choose to
 transact in the legal sector. Finally, all agents in each population with 0 ? Okprefer
 to cooperate in the illegal sector rather than transact in the legal sector, and they can
 also commit to cooperating in equilibrium. So all agents in population S with 0 2 OS
 will transact in the legal sector with all agents in population B for which 0 < 0B,
 and they will transact cooperatively in the illegal sector with all agents in popula-
 tion B for which 0 ? 0B. Since all agents transacting in the illegal sector do coop-
 erate, punishment is never observed. This equilibrium is summarized in the following
 proposition and depicted in figure 4.
 PROPOSITION 1. When all players use the above-described trigger strategy with infi-
 nitely lasting punishment, all transactions between agents in population S with
 0 ' As and agents in population B with 0 2 aB are undertaken cooperatively in the
 illegal sector. All other transactions are in the legal sector
 The size of the underground economy is consequently given by [1 - Fs(6s)] [1 -
 FB( sB)] so an increase in either Os or 0B will cause the size of the underground
 economy to diminish. Proposition 1 has a feature that cannot be found in the stan-
 dard literature on tax evasion. Some agents in each population who would like to
 evade taxes are not able to do so (those with 0 between 6k and Ok). The reason is that
 these agents are too 'honest' (have a low tolerance for dishonesty 0) and are not able
 to commit to cooperating: they would always deviate from a cooperative equilib-
 rium. Because honesty is observable by transacting partners, no agents from the
 other population want to trade with them in the illegal sector. In contrast to the
 standard literature, it is not solely the difference between the payoffs in the legal
 and illegal sectors that determines who is the marginal evading agent, but the ability
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 of this agent to commit to cooperating in equilibrium. This difference has substan-
 tive implications for the effects of policy, as the following proposition demonstrates.
 PROPOSITION 2. If allplayers use the above-described trigger strategy with infinitely
 lasting punishment, then, in equilibrium:
 (a) If 8k < (P2 Pt )/P2, an increase in the sanction Sk leads to a reduction in ok
 which leads to an increase in the number of transactions that are made in the
 illegal sector
 (b) For all ak, an increase in the tax rate leads to an reduction in ok' which leads to
 an increase in the number of transactions that are made in the illegal sector
 Proposition 2(a) indicates that if the discount factor is low enough, an increase in
 the sanction Sk applied to either sellers or buyers can increase the number of agents
 who can commit to cooperating forever in the illegal sector, that is, dOk/dsk < 0.
 The intuition is as follows. When Sk increases, the payoff from cooperating forever
 in the illegal sector decreases, while the payoff from taking the punishment phase in
 the legal sector stays the same. This makes it harder for an agent to commit to
 cooperating. At the same time, an increase in Sk leads to a reduction in the payoff
 from deviating larger than that from cooperating. This can lead to an increase in
 cooperation (a reduction in Ok) if the discount factor is low enough.
 Similarly, proposition 2(b) indicates that when tk increases, the payoff from the
 punishment phase decreases so it becomes more attractive for an agent to cooper-
 ate. This result might be compared with that obtained in the standard model, where
 an increase in the tax rate causes a reduction in evasion if absolute risk aversion is
 decreasing with income (Myles 1995). Of course, since all households are risk
 neutral in our model, the comparison is of limited relevance. It is worth emphasiz-
 ing that only one type of agent's sanction or tax needs to increase to cause the
 number of illegal transactions to go up. Moreover, the sanctions and the taxes applied
 to buyers and sellers may differ considerably.
 4. Extensions
 In this section we consider two extensions to the above analysis. First, we study
 what happens when the level of sanctions s is such that assumption 2 no longer
 applies. As we have seen, when s is outside the range [s, s], the effort subgame is
 not a prisoner's dilemma. While proposition 2 no longer applies, it will turn out to
 be straightforward to characterize the effect of sanctions on the quantity of illegal
 transactions throughout the range of s. This will allow us to draw more general
 policy implications of the impact of a change in the level of sanctions. Second, we
 investigate the consequences when sanctions on the buyers and sellers are asym-
 metric. Although this complicates the analysis considerably, we are able to obtain
 some policy implication of adopting such a strategy.
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 4.1. The impact of the sanction
 When assumption 2 is satisfied, the infinitely repeated nature of the game allows
 tax evaders to enforce a high level of effort on each other, a desirable outcome that
 is generally not possible in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. However, assump-
 tion 2 applies only if s ? s ? s. Consider what happens outside that range.
 First, if s < s, assumption 2(a) is violated. With a small sanction, the players'
 joint payoff is maximized when they provide low effort. This poses no problem,
 since the Nash equilibrium in that case also entails providing low effort. Thus, there
 is no need for the players to use a trigger strategy: they simply provide low effort
 when transacting in the illegal sector and there is no need for punishment. The
 unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game involves all
 illegal transactions being undertaken with low effort. Lemma 3 tells us that agents
 with 6 ' 6 are those who prefer an illegal transaction without cooperation to a legal
 transaction. Therefore, the size of the underground economy is given by [1 -
 Fs(6)] [1 - FB(6)] .10 For s < s, then, an increase in the sanction leads unambig-
 uously to a reduction of the size of the underground economy, since 6 is decreasing
 with s. On the other hand, an increase in t amplifies the size of the underground
 economy.
 At the other extreme, when s > s, Assumptions 2 (b) and/or 2 (c) are not satis-
 fied. In this case, a high level of effort both maximizes payoffs and is the unique
 Nash equilibrium of the effort subgame. There is no need for a trigger strategy to
 enforce cooperation. Thus, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
 infinitely repeated game is the one in which all players provide high effort when
 transacting illegally. Since agents with 6 ? 6 prefer to transact cooperatively in the
 illegal sector rather than to transact in the legal sector, the size of the underground
 economy is given by [1 - Fs(8)] [1 - Fb( )]. This is decreasing with the sanc-
 tion and increasing with the tax rate. For a given tax rate, there will eventually be a
 level of sanctions, denoted by Sm' at which the underground economy will have
 been eliminated. This corresponds with the Becker (1968) maximal sanction.
 We are now able to characterize the potential impact of the sanction on the size
 of the illegal sector. Figure 5 presents the situation corresponding with the case in
 which proposition 2(a) is satisfied. There, we assume that the players do adopt
 the above-described trigger strategy when s < s < s, and that the condition 8k <
 (P2 - Pl)!2 holds. Figure 5 presents the size of the illegal sector, denoted by g, as
 a function of the sanction s. Recall that s is the value of s such that assumption 2(a)
 is satisfied with equality.'2 Similarly, s is the value of s such that either assumption
 2(b) or assumption 2(c) is satisfied with equality, while the other may still be sat-
 isfied as an inequality.'3
 10 Note that when SS = sB = S, then Os = 0B = 0.
 11 Again, when SS = sB = S, then dS = OB = =.
 12 In particular s = c/(po - P2), and if s < s, assumption 2(a) is not satisfied.
 13 In other words, s1= min{c/(po - p1 ), c/(p - P2)}. Note that s > s. When s > s, assumption 2 is
 violated.
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FIGURE 5 Possible impact of the sanction on the illegal sector 
Suppose the government would prefer the size of the illegal sector to be as small 
as possible. As figure 5 indicates, the illegal sector is decreasing in s when s < § or 
whens > s, but it is increasing ins between§ ands. Under such circumstances, and 
if there is no restriction on the size of the sanction, it is obviously optimal to sets at 
its maximal level, sm , thereby eliminating all underground transactions. But if there 
is a limit on the sanction that could be imposed, 14 the government would not nec­
essarily want to impose the largest permissible sanction. For example, if the limit to 
the sanction falls between :f. ands, then the optimal sanction is§. The simple policy 
implication here is that the largest permissible sanction is not necessarily that which 
minimizes the amount of crime. 
4.2. Asymmetric sanctions 
Suppose the government can impose different sanctions on the buyers and the sell­
ers. Note, first, that when the sanctions are such that assumption 2 is satisfied for 
both agents and proposition l applies, asymmetric sanctions have the same impact 
as symmetric ones. That is, proposition 2(a) applies to changes in sanctions on one 
side of the market alone. Note that this result requires that sanctions be imposed on 
both sides of the market so that§ ::s s k ::s s for k = S, B ( and that agents adopt trigger 
strategies). It is not sufficient to impose sanctions on one side only. By the same 
token, if assumption 2 is violated in the same direction for both types of agents -
either sk <§ or sk > s fork= S, B - the same results as above apply. In these ranges, 
an increase in the sanction on either agent will reduce the size of the underground 
economy. 
14 The reasons for this could be ethical, but also technological, informational, or, even simpler, a 
matter of costs. 
Matters are more complicated if assumption 2 is satisfied for one type of agent 
and violated for the other. For example, consider the case where assumption 2 is 
satisfied for type-B agents, but violated for type-S agents. Take the extreme case 
where the sanction on the sellers is set to zero. Then, all sellers prefer to transact in 
the illegal sector, and because assumption 2(a) is violated, they will choose a low 
level of effort. In such a case, a type-B agent cannot expect cooperation to be 
enforced. Thus, the size of the illegal sector is determined Bk> the level of 8 identi­
fying an agent indifferent between transacting legally and transacting illegally with­
out cooperation. Because all sellers prefer the illegal sector, the size of the illegal 
sector is 1 [1 - F( 88)], and an increase in s8 reduces the size of the illegal sector. At 
the same time, an increase in ss from zero will also reduce the size of the illegal 
sector to [1 - F(Bs)J[l - F(88)]. A similar analysis can be performed for other 
combinations of the sanctions. The results will obviously be different, but they will 
have the same flavour. 
A number of other questions might be raised once asymmetric sanctions are in­
troduced. For one thing, if side payments were allowed in the infinitely repeated game, 
asymmetric sanctions might have the same impact as symmetric ones of the same to­
tal size. For another, if the two illegal traders are not detected at the same time, asym­
metric sanction might be used to extract information from the agent who has been 
detected, analogous to a system of plea bargaining. These questions are beyond the 
scope of the present analysis, but would be interesting topics for further analysis. 
5. Conclusion
The two main results of this paper are as follows. First, when tax evasion requires 
the complicity of two agents (e.g., a buyer and a seller), a key determinant of which 
transactions are in the illegal sector is the ability of each of the participating agents 
to commit to undertaking the cooperative level of avoidance activity. Indeed, some 
agents would like to evade taxes, but cannot because of their inability to commit to 
cooperate. In our model, ability to commit is determined by an agent's tolerance for 
dishonesty. More dishonest agents are better able to commit, since their payoffs 
from illegal activity are higher. Second, when the discount factor is low enough, an 
increase in the sanction can increase the ability of an agent to commit to cooperate, 
and can lead to more tax evasion. 
Our analysis could be extended in several ways. The current model assumes that 
aversion to dishonesty (8) as well as past deviations are observable. As is shown in 
Mongrain (2001), making these things costly to observe - in the limit unobserv­
able - can help to explain the dynamics ofrecidivism. Indeed, individuals may then 
go back and forth from the legal to the illegal sector. In the same vein, individuals 
could search for partners in the illegal sector rather than meeting them randomly. If 
search costs are large enough, cheating is less likely to occur, because individuals 
willing to transact in the illegal sector would find it more difficult to seek each other 
out. It would also be possible to endogenize the size of the surplus that agents 
obtain when transacting. For example, an individual with a low aversion to dishon-
esty may decide to carry out relatively large transactions in the illegal sector. Finally, 
the current analysis is a positive one. It would be interesting to compare optimal 
deterrence policy - optimal probability of detection and sanctions - in the current 
multi-agent framework with those that obtain in the standard tax evasion model. 
Appendix 
Proof of lemma 1. For any agent i in population S, the discounted payoff of coop­
erating forever is given by 1r c (O;)/(l -8s ), while the discounted payoff of deviat­
ing is 1r d(O;) + 8s 1r
1/(1 -8s). Agent i will prefer cooperating forever if 1r
c(O;)/ 
(l -8s ) � 1r
d(O;) + 8s 1r
1/(l -8s), or equivalently if[O;Vs -p2 ss -c]/(l - 8s ) � 
[O;vs -p 1 ss ] + 8s [vs -ts ]f(l -8s ). Therefore, all agents with O � Os will want 
to cooperate, and all agents with O < Os will want to deviate, where Os = 
(8s(Vs -ts)+ (p2 ss + c) -(I -8s )P1 ss )/(8svs ). We can find 08 in the same way . 
Proof of lemma 2. An agent i in population k fork = S, B will prefer to cooperate 
in the illegal sector rather than transacting in the legal sector if 1rHO) � 1rl, or if 
O;vk -p2 sk -c � vk -tk. Therefore, agent i will prefer the illegal sector ifO � Bk, 
where Bk = (vk -tk + p2sk + c)/vk > 0. • 
Proof of lemma 3. An agent i in population k for k = S, B will prefer to not coop­
erate in the illegal sector rather than transacting in the legal sector if 1rf ( 0) � 1r £, or 
if O;vk -p0sk � vk -tk. It is apparent that agent i will prefer the illegal sector if 
0 � Ok > where Ok = (vk -tk + p0sk)/vk < l.  
Proof of lemma 4. Using (2) and (3), Bk < Ok fork = S,B if (vk - tk + p2 sk +
c)/vk < (8k(vk -tk) + P2 Sk + C - (I -8k)p,sk)/(8kvk), or p2sk + C > P1 Sk > which 
we have assumed to be satisfied. Using (2) and (4), it is possible to show that Ok < 
Ok < l fork = S,B ifp0sk > p2 sk + c > p1 sk > which holds given assumption 2. • 
Proof of proposition I. This is an immediate implication of lemma 4 and of the 
description of the equilibrium. • 
Proof of proposition 2. Using Ok from lemma l, we obtain aok/ask = (p2 -
(1 -8k)p1 )/(8kvk), which is negative if 8k < (p1 -p2 )/p1 . We know from propo­
sition 1 that Ok determines which transactions are made in the legal or illegal sectors 
for each group. Since F k ' (·) > 0, and since the number of transactions in the illegal 
sector is [1 - Fs(Os )][l -F
8(08 )], it follows that anything that decreases Ok also 
increases the number of illegal transactions. As for the tax, using equation (2) 
yields aodatk = -1/vk < 0. • 
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